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A NEW APPROACH TO GAUDAPADAKARIKA 
- N. Aiyaswami Sastri 
Gaudapada's work, that is, his Karika in four chapters, may be 
regarded an important landmark in the development of the Advaita 
Vedantic thought. His exposition of Advaitism is unique and without 
parallel in the Vedantic literature. He does not follow the traditional 
line of argument for upholding his thesis. The language he has adopted 
is Buddhistic in many parts. He employed several expressions which are 
common to Buddhism and its philosophy and which create impression in 
the mind of readers that the author (Gaudapada) was a follower of Bud-
dhism (v.V. Bhattacharya's edition of the Karika). It is mysterious 
indeed why Gaudapada should have at all adopted such an ambiguous 
language betraying his trustfulness to the Advaitic thought and tradition. 
He is traditionally regarded a disciple of the sage Suka in the Sveta. up. 
bhasya ad 1,8, and a grandpl'eceptor of Sri Sankara through Govindabha-
gavatpada (v.R.D. Karmarkar's edn. ofthe Karika, Introduction). He has, 
perhaps, been influenced by Buddhism, especially in its later developed 
form, because he was a native of the Gauda country where Buddhism was 
a prominent and popular faith in his days. He might have aimed at 
propagation of Advaitism in the popular language and style of Buddhism 
which might appeal to the lay as well as the learned men of the society 
in those days. This appears to be the most plausible explanation of the 
riddle why Gaudapada adopted such an ambiguous style which being 
improperly understood would convey the converse of what he intends 
to convey. 
Thus we meet with two sets of interpretations of the text one 
tending towards Buddhism and the other opposing it (e.g. V. Bhattacharya 
and R.D. Karmarkar). I shall confine myself in the following pages 
mainly to clear off the wrong interpretations of the ambiguous expres-
sions employed by Gaudapada in the course of upholding his fundamental 
thesis of Advaitism. 
The text consists of four chapters, of which the first contains 
29 verses explaining the Mandukyopanishad. The central theme of the 
Upanishad is the description of four stages of Atman, Brahman known as 
Visva, Taijasa. Prajna and Turya (fourth) who is Sarvadrk, perceiver of 
th~ whole. The first three stages are represented in the following states 
in order: Waking (Jagarita), Dream, and Deep Sleep. The fourth is 
the transcendental state. Atman in the first three stages generally 
stays in the three places of the body: the left eye, mind and heart res-
pectively. The mystic syllable 'Om' while considered to be consisting 
of three parts: a, u and m represents the first three states of Brahman. 
While considered as part less and one unit it represents the fourth 
Advaita state of Brahman (Karika, 29). Gaudapada points out the dis-
tinction between the third and the fourth state thus: the non-grasping 
of dualism is common to both states, but the Atman in the third is under 
the influence of avidya, nescience and sleep, while in the fourth Atman 
is relieved of both (K.19). He says furth·~r that the living being who 
is caught in the slumber of immemorial Maya (Illusion) gets awakened, 
then he realiz~s Advaita (Monism) which is freed from birth and sleep 
(K. (6). 
This idea is common to Yogacara Buddhism. If we substitute 
Cittamatrata for Advaita the passage would turn into a Buddhistic maxim. 
This chapter is rightly styled as o mkaraprakarana , an exposition of the 
Om syllable. Read for fuller contents of the chapter Karmarkar, Intro-
duction, X.f. 
The second chapter named Vaitathya-prakarana consists of 
38 verses. The chapter starts with the elucidation of the external 
world and its futility on the analogy of dream phenomenon. The 
illusory character of our objective universe is a common doctrine of 
hoth the Vcdantic and the Yogacara Buddhist and the dream analogy is 
also a common weapon to demonstrate their position. Reference to 
Vasubandhu's Vimsatika, verse I with bhasya. Another common exam-
ple for the purpose is the illusory notion of the Serpent on the Rope in 
the twilight. Gauda says: Just as the idea of serpent is imagined on 
the rope in the dark, just so is the idea of Jiva-atman imposed on the Brah-
man. When true knowledge of the rope is gained the illusion of serpent 
disappears; likewise one atman is discriminated as diverse through the 
influence of Maya and when the true character of atman's oneness is 
ascertained .he discrimination disappears (KK. 16- 17). 
Then the author elaborates the views of different thinkers who 
a!lsume erroneously as the ultimate reality things such as Prana, breath, 
elements, Guna etc. Gauda does not omit to mention in the list the 
ultimate reality of Buddhist, viz. mind, manas, citta (K. 25). Here the 
absence of Jnana, Vijnana or Prajnana is noteworthy because it is charac-
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teristic of Atman, Brahman stated in the Upanisads. It has been in £ine 
remarked that the entire universe is to be considered by the Vedantin 
as a dream, illusion or castle in the air. The highest truth is that there 
is no annihilation, nor origination, no fettered person nor aspirer of 
truth and no desirous of release nor released (K. 32). This utterance of 
Gauda, resembles very closely to Nagarjuna's characteristic Nihilism. 
If the stanza i. detached from the context one could hardly think that this 
utterance comes from a Vedantin. Gauda, comes very close to Nagar-
juna because both of them plead for the unreality of the diverse world 
and for one absolute \Vhole. They, however, differ in their approach 
to the ultimate truth. Naga. would designate it Sunyata, or the highest 
perfection of wisdom whereas for Gauda, it is Atman or Brahman, 
an embodiment of the highest knowledge. efr. Sveta. up. bhasya, 
Gitapress, p.46, citing the Brahmapurana. 
Gauda closes this chap (II) with the declaration that Non-
dualism is auspicious (ore:l{::fT f~, K. 3 3) and the same as Adva ita 
or Tattva. He further says: Advaya which implies th' negation of 
plurality and of the mind's cons1 ructiYe states has been revealed by the 
Sages that have reached the yonder shore of Vedic lore (K,H). The 
Advaya doctrine is common to the Mahayanic Buddhists. It is probably 
for this rea~Oll that Gauda adds that his doctrine of Advaya has been 
revealed by the Vedic Sages with the implication that he is not speaking 
of the Buddhist doctrine. We may likewise find several times in 
Sankara's bhasya on the Upanisads the expression of Advaya in relation 
to Brahman. 
It is to be noted here that Amarasinha, the Sanskrit Lexico-
grapher has credited Buddha with preaching the Advaya doctl'ine proba-
bly for the first time, Both schools of later Buddhism, the Madhyamika 
and the Yogacara proudly acclaim themselves as great champions of 
the Advaya doctrine though the import of the term, advaya, is quite 
different for each school. For the Madhyamika it conveys the idea 
of middle path, Madhyama-pratipad whereas for the Yogacara 
it signifies the absence of subject and object Un?:'quT~CfiT+tlq 
Though Gauda and Sankara characterize Brahman as advaya 
they probably intend to convey the idea of advitiya, "without 
the second", i.e. Advaita. Now I leave it to future studies to decide 
which school initiated the doctrine and which one adopted it later. 
The third chap (III) named Advaita-prakarana contains 4 8 
verses. The ~xposition of Advaita in this chapter is quite logical in 
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succession after establishing the futility of the diverse world in the second 
chapter. This chapter may also be named as Akarpanya-prakarana as the 
author starts in the second stanza as arm qlt~T~ctiltfull'l "I shall elucidate 
unpitiableness". In the first stanza Gauda has stated that the worship, 
upasana, is rdatt:d to the Karya-Brahman, Hiranya-garbha etc. The 
worsbipper being different from the worshipped occupies a pitiable 
state, krpana. In fact every body is Aja, unbom, ie. Brahman prior to 
an illusory creation. For this reason, says Gauda-I shall elucidate 
Akarpanya, unpitiableness which is a quality of Brahmic state 
3f\ifTfCi~at qCii{. It appears therefore that Akarpanya may fittingly be 
equated to the Advaitic state. Brah. Up. mentions krpana as opposed to 
Brahmana, v. passage cited below, comm. No. 16. 
The main arguments of this chapter may be summed up as 
follows: 
I. There is nothing born; some philosophers advocate the birth 
of what is unbolJ1. The unborn is immortal, how could it be reduced 
to mor:ality? (K.20) No Jiva, person is born; this is the ultimate 
truth comprising an absolute non-existence of birth (K.48). 
2. Relation between Jiva and Brahman is similar to that between 
the vast space and the space ·within the pot (ghata-akasa); that is to say 
the differellt.e between them is made by the limiting adjunct (Upadhi-
ghata). The moment the pot is destroyed the dilference disppears 
(K. 3-4)' This illustration of space is made in respect of birth. So 
ghata-akasa is neither a product nor a part of Akasa. Likewise are Jiva 
and Brahman (K. 7). The aggregates (material objects) are creations 
of one's own illusion, maya and simi lar to those in dream (K. 10). 
Hence the identity of Jiva and Brahman is much extolled in the scripture 
Upanishads and their diH<';rentiation is severely censured there-which 
position is quite rational (K. I 3). Thus non-dualism is the Absolute 
Truth and dualism is only its variety (K. 1 8). The same idea is echoed 
in the Vishnudharmottara cited in Sveta. Up.bhashya, p. 48. 
3. In the light of non-dualism stressed in seyeral Upanishads 
the passages dealing with the process of creation of the universe are to be 
explained away as a devise for l~ading people to the ulitimate purpose 
of identity of Jiva with Brahman (Kk.IS,24-2S)' 
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..... Mind is a sole factor for dualism, llit)~ltf~ ir"al{ when 
the mind is reduced to a non-entity (amanibhava) dualism vanishes 
(K. 3 I). The mind is so reduced when one does not conceive anything 
as a result of realizing and experiencing the truth of Atman, Brahman 
(K.32). The same topic has been elaborated in Kk.34.38,40' In 
deep sleep the mind is laid low and being controlled it is cut off from its 
activity; then it becomes Brahman which is embodied in an all-round 
illumination of knowledge (Kk. 3 ~ ,46). It is unborn, sleepless, dreamless, 
devoid of name and form, onmiscient and flashing up once only (K.36, 
cp.Kk.37-40). One should therefore control the mind through proper 
means when it becomes distracted by pleasure and enjoyment. Recollec-
ting that everything is miserable one should turn its back from pleasure 
and enjoyment, and recollecting that everything is unborn one sees 
nothing as born (K.43). When the mind becomes low-spirited it 
should be awakened; heing distracted it should be pacified; being 
contaminated with impurities it should be watched with care, and being 
attained to the state of eguilihriam it should not be shaken up. One 
should not enjoy pleasure out of concentration, but should get detached 
from it through his wisdom; the mind being steady and motionless one 
should with efforts free it from its dualistic tendency. When the mind 
is not laid low and not distracted, the mind which is now motionless 
and freed from its dualistic reflection turns into Brahman (Kk.44-46). 
Comment. N<{w let us st'.e whetter ar,y of the above topics 
of Gauda can be Cflmpared with ideas of the Buddhist authors. 
I) Our (( mIT.ent on the Ajativada is deferred to the next 
chapter on the same lopic. 
2) The space-example is also found in a Mahayana sutra cited 
in M. vrtti, p. 375 which insists on the identity of all entities on the 
analogy of space. The passage runs: a~~Tfq ifJ;r ~'r' It'il' 
~r\'if;;~T~'tIfTilfiT~ It'iI' ~('iJ'¥I'T~T~~ a:rT"'J?iI~~~~: I ae'IR-
~T~ffi' if flfif'ta.: ;;TifTilfi~1lf~ I'" .....•• 
3) Gaucla says that the Upanishadic doctrine of creation is a devise 
for some ultimate purpose (K. 1 ~); this looks like an echo ofVasubandhu's 
explanation of Buddha's jutterences about skandha, ayatana and dhatu 
(V. Vasubandhu's Vimsatika, ver. 8-10). Buddha is regarded as Upaya-
kusala, clever in employing devices suitable to convert people to hi 
own faith (Cp. Satyasicldhi, ch. I.p.~,n.3). It is likely therefore that 
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Gauda was conversed in ar.d convinced of the advantage of the Buddhist 
argument to explain away the syaings contradictory to their favourite 
conclusions. 
4-) "This dualistic appearance is a vision of th mind" 1li1T~l(lJ­
f+r<i i~ (K. 3 J "), this (:'xpression seems to be resulted fmm the dream 
example employed several times in the Tre<l.tise by Gauda (cp. K.30 
also). According to the Upanishads it is the mind that creates a new 
imaginery world in dream, cp e.g. Prasna: up. IV, ~: 3f;:~llf ~q; (::'1~:) 
~H l1f({l1F'I'1'!'+I'flTfa-· .. ••·•···· since tht! same axiom is applicflbh to 
the waking state the above expression "manodrsyam" has perhaps been 
coined. The Vedantin would otherwise expre:;s it as +rTlJFf'ifuq~ or 
m<nf~f;J:'+I'all etc. Since the Yogacara Buddhists also plead that the 
universe is imaginary and a creation of mind they would repeat the idea 
as '1~:)~l(lJ~ ij'cf using 'sarvam' instead of' 'dvaitam". The above state-
ment would also result authentically into another axiom: q;;lJT f;:p;r~T~~ 
........ I rg:~&ni: ••...... the end of misery is brought about by 
the mind's control (K. 4-0). 
It is interesting to note that the above ideas of Gaucla haye 
some parallels in the Vishnmlharma (in the group of six chapters) 
as follows;-
alfCfW ::q fSfilfT: ij'CfT f<RTT IDi1' 5f:qel~ I 
<fi+f IlfT GfTl:Ja- Gf;:crfcl'ilil:JT 'if fflTi1::;;lfa- II 
alici q~'1T~1 fi ia a-f~ '" .::;;lfa- I 
~~r~d(ni"~l~l:f ali a- P.if", lfqT q~~ II 
iT" (CfQf+rfa- SI~Tfq~ alfCJ~~CM'q: I 
arfflT1fip:f'1ifT~itlfllii" 6 '1<l+Jlla I 
"'''' '1;:fT~~'1li ita'1Q:"o' 'R:'1I'4a-: II 
'1o{ij'T 'l~lf: a-fl11~ ~'1T\,l~ f.,fiRNfr: I 
f.r{t;[om: qf~)~ rici <TCf)qq~ 1\ 
q;:r)~fll<i «<t. (lfieptS::qa«:q~l'if~ I 
'1rmr w+r<lr~T~S&"(fifrci ~ltTlf~~ ~Il 
Cfi+r'+l'TCf.,lfT 9~q fCJ~T<l5qGfl~ I 
(fTE'fi;. +fCffa- fcmfC(flJk~r ~~ ..,1<:All 
eli{ ffilJr: q~ ~ ~qllitq 5f'f;r;rrii II 
20 
"All actions are (the result of) neseience, (avidya) and vidya is 
regarded as knowledge. The creature takes birth as a result of its 
action and it gets released as a result of viclya, (knowledge). The ultin-.ate 
truth is Advaita, (monism) and dualism is only its variety. The notion 
"I" and' 'mine" ~rises from the lack of wisdom; Advaita, on the other 
hand, is experienced as freed from conceptions and as unspeakable, 
Dvaita is embodied in the mind's activities which are born of their 
causes, dharma and adharma, merit and demerit. They are to be 
made ceased and at their cessation dualism dvaitam becomes utterly 
irrational. This entire universe is imagined by the mind alone and the 
monistic state is secured when the mind becomes non-entity (amanibhava) 
or non-mind. The cognitive experience~ arise in accordance with the 
resultant forces of action karma-vasana, that is the consciousness arises 
in such a fashion as tht: forces assume and as soon as it is removed or 
stopped the ultimate Truth; Brahman shines forth of its own accord" 
(cited in the Svet. bhashya, pp 48-49, Gita press) . 
Note. Vijnana and Vijnapti are employed in the same 
import as in Yogacar<'. Buddhism. The idea that at the stoppage of 
mind's activities Truth shines forth can be compared with 
the Yoga Sutra I, 1,2 : ~T ire~:~~qscr~~T;:ri{ , cpo Sankara 
bhashya on Gita, XVIII, 50 : ;:rTJf~q+f;:rT~I"'"iflUqurf~fD: 'fiTm, 
K. 35. The idea of Gauda that the mind being controlled and 
checkrd in its ?ctivity turns out into Brahman (cp. K.46) looks like the 
Yogacara's favourite thesis that the mind being stopped in its creation 
of dualism ~T~llT~'fillTq turns out into Dharmadhatu, i.t:. Tathagata 
(v. Trimsika, ver.28 with bhashya). It does not, however, follow that 
Gauda formed his idea after the pattern of Y ogacara Buddhism. The 
Vedantin has his own reasoning for it. Sankara pleads once: Mind 
(manas) is Brahman because the latter is the inner core of the former 
CfC'5fflHTT~~IFcrT~ Kena. Up bhashya II, 2,4. The Vedantin's 
definition of Jiva is: conscious spirit circumscribed by the limiting 
adjunct, the inner organ, i.e. the mind, etc (Vedantaparibhasha.) 
When the inner organ is made deprived of its functioning it becomes 
pure consciousness, caitanya like Ghatakasa becoming the vast space 
at the destruction of the pot. 
K·3 6. Sakrt-vibhatam, flashing up once. This expression 
again appears in chap lV, K. 81. Its synonym is Sakrt-jyotis found in 
chap III, K. 37. Atman is also stated to be Svayamjyotis in Br. Up. 
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IV, .3, I4. Gaudamade itsvayam-prabhatam (IV, 81). The Mahasanghi-
ka Buddhist have also characterised their original mind as Prakrti-prabhasva-
rain. The Sakrt-vibhatam may be considered in relation with some 
Buddhists' theory of Eka-kshan~-abhisambodha, one moment's intuition 
of Truth. This theory has been advocated by the Madhyamikas and also 
in the Satya-siddhi (ch.26-27) as against the Vaibhashikas' theory of 
gradual intuition of the four Truths (anupurvabhisamaya), The one 
moment's intuition is advocated for the reason that the Truth is on Iy 
one, viz. Cessation-Truth, Nirodha-satya. May we guess now that 
there may be some link between these two theories of the Vedantin 
and the Buddhist? Sankara perhaps refers to this one moment's intuition 
theory while commenting on the Kena. Up. II, 2,4: >rfQ~)!:lr~ 
as ~~~ srfa'iI')~ ~(t(q-t "according to some pratibodha implies 
one moment's consciousness". We may also take note here of 
the Br. Up. II, 3.6: ...... If¥.fT ~~.:n' ~~fir~'efq ~qT 3Tfl{ 
,,;ft~fQ If 1:!;<f ~ and Sankara's bhashya thereon. 
K. 44. Gauda's prescription of cure for the mind's concentra-
tion-ills is comparable with that of the Buddhist authors. Gauda says 
that the mind gets distracted due to its inclination to enjoy the sensuous 
pleasures and it becomes low-spirited on account of some mental illness 
etc. Both the states are detrimental to the ultimate goal. So Gauda 
advises that the mind should be pacified when it becomes distracted, and 
it should be awakened when it becomes low-spirited. 
According to the Buddhists mind's stubbornness and low-spirits 
are two impediments to the Enlightenment. When the mind is stubborn 
one should cultivate calnmess, concentration and equanimity because 
through these three factors the stubborn mind can easily be pacified. 
When the mind becomes low-spirited the yogin should cultivate analy-
tical thinking, exertion and joy because through these factors the 
low-spirited mind can easily be awakened (Samyutta V, 12 ff). The S. 
Siddhi discusses this point in greater details. When it is distracted the 
act of controlling should be applied; when it is too subdued the act of 
slackening should be applied. The goldsmith, thus melts the gold, 
heatens it, waters and keeps it on timely. If it is too heatened it 
becomes fluid being too cooled it becomes thickened and being kept 
on it becomes explanded Likewise is the yogin's mind (ch. 156). The 
tamed horse also may be compared here (Ibid). 
The Y ogasutra refers to about nine factors of distraction and their 
s<'tellites about five in all (I, 30-32). In order to check them an exercise 
22 
or contemplation on Eka-tattva, single truth is advised; the mind may 
again be appeaced by means of contemplation of four devices Maitri, 
love, Karuna, compassion, Mudita, joyfulness and Upeksha, indiflerel.ce 
(I. 33), orby some such other means (1,34). The Yogasutra speaks 
nothing about the kinds of unfavourable mental states as the Buddhist 
sources or Gauda describe. 
It is therefore ll1Qst likely that Gauda was acquainted with the 
Buddhist tradition regarding the Dhyana process and made use of it in 
his ovm fashion to suit his favourite thesis. The mind's distraction 
(=stubbornness in Buddhism) which arises due to sensuous pleasure should 
be checked by recollecting the affective axiom that everything is miser-
able, a formula quite popular in Buddhism (K.4-3). Gauda says in the 
same breath that by recollecting everything as unborn one does not see 
anything as born. But the link between the first and the second state-
ment is not quite obvious and logical. Gauda probably adopts Patanjali' s 
opinion of Eka-tattva-abhyasa, contemplation-exercise on single truth 
(Yogasutra 1, 32). It appears to us in that case that we should interpret 
"aja" unborn as Brahman and "jata" born as illusory things. CfT. 
our remark on the title of the third chapter above. 
K. +6. Our comment on this chapter may be closed with 
Gauda's instructive remark on the mind and its ultimate reality. He 
states: When the mind is not low-spirited and distracted, the same. 
which is now motionless and freed from its dualistic reflection turns 
out into Brahman-which statement may suggest to us that Gauda expresses 
a Buddhistic idea in the Vedantic terminology. How it could be justi-
fied from the Advaita Vedantin's standpoint of view that has been made 
clear previously v. comment on K. H. 
Chap IV 
The fourth chapter traditionally styled as Alatasanti prakarana 
consists of just a hundred stanzas eight of which are repetitions from the 
previous chapters. This chapter contains several puzzling and enigmatic 
expl'essions which led some scholars to doubt whether the author was 
truly an Advaita Vedantin. Hence the chapter is intrcsting to us in 
more than one respect. Its theme is the same as that of the previous 
chapter viz. elucidation of Advaitism in greater details. 
The main topics may be summed up as below;-
I. Criticism of jati-vada, theory of origiflation. The origination-
theorists are all dualistic thinkers, viz, Sankhya, Vaiseshika, the Buddhists 
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with the exception of the Madhyamikas. They may be grouped into 
two: a) Some plead for origination of what is non-existent, b) others 
plead for the origination of what is cl early existent, thus they both dispute 
each other and lead ultimately to non-origination which we approve and 
never dispute with them. 
The author redicules the theory of origination, Jativada as it 
does not stand a moment's scrutiny; hence Ajativada, non-origination 
is only rationally acceptable conclusion (Kk 3-23,71). The important 
factor that brightens ajati, non-originatioll is the non-recognition of the 
order of sequence between the cause and the effect (K.2 l) ; it becomes 
thus obvious that nothing originates from itself or something else, nor 
does anything originates whether it is existent or non-existent etc. 
(K.22). cpo Nagarjuna's maxim ;:y ~qCfT i'fTfq 'f{~T Maclh. Sastra. 
Likewise the non-existent is not caused by the non-existent 
nor is the existent caused by the non-existent. The existent c,.)m()t 
he caused by the existent. How can the non-exist'ent be caused by the 
exist,ent? (K. 4o). This looks like Nagarjuna's dialectic. The origina-
tion, hmvcver, has hten preached by the enlightened sage~;, Buddhas 
for thosc ,vho are frightened at the doctrine of non-origination and those 
who helieve in the true existence of things as they experience their 
activites (K. 4 3); viewing thus the wise enter into the truth of 11on-
origination of the cause and the effect (K .. ~4). 
2. Prajnapti. The Empirical experience, prajanapti is conditioned 
by its cause; if it is not so, dualism or diversity (that is experienced hy us) 
would be destroyed. Because the defilement. is operative its causal 
production (paratantJa) is accepted (in the empirical field of dualism). 
Prajnapti (the worldly experience) is regarded as conditioned by causes 
(nimitta) from the viewpoint of logic. The cause, (nimitta) becomes 
non-cause (animitta) from the viewpoint of Truth (Kk. 24-25). 
3. Dream. The dream-example is elaborated and applied to 
things experienced in the waking state (Kk.J2-J7,39,61-68). Waking 
{·xperience is applied to dream state in K. 41. Just as one expcdences 
the unthinkable objects (acintya) as real in the waking state, just 50 one 
experiences things in dream; perversion (viparyaya) is tht' cadsing factor' 
in both cases. 
4. Maya and Nirmitaka. The magic elephant is regarded as real 
because it moves and causes experiences; likewise are the~xternal 
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things (K.H). Buddha (-Gautama) preached: "Things are originated 
on accoUl1t of causes and conditions"; this origination is comparable 
with magic, and the magic too does not at all exist (K. S8). The illusory 
person is born and dies; likewise the living beings are existent (born) 
and non-existent (die) (K.69). The same is repeated with the illustra-
tion of Nirmitaka, created being (K. 70). 
S. Alata, firebrand, whirling of the firebrand causes the appearance 
of a wheel, so the vibration of consciousness gives rise to the appearance 
of the subject-object notions. When the firebrand is stopped it causes 
no such appearance but remains in its unb:Jrn state. While the fire-
brand is whirling the appearance of wheel does not come from the 
the outsi<le and enters into the fire brand, nor does the \vheel appearance 
go outof the fire brand, because it is not a substance; so is the case with 
Vijnana being at vibration, the appearance of the subject and object does 
not come from the outside and enters into Vijnana, nor does the apperance 
go out of it because the subject-object appearance is not a substance. 
The appearance is always unthinkable (acintya) because no law of causa-
tion between the two (Vijnana and appearance) is operative (Kk.4-7-P) 
6. Citta and artba. Mind does not touch the object nor does it 
reflect the object, because the object is unreal and so is its reflection. 
The mind touches no cause (nimitta) in all three times-Perversion is 
causeless by itself, how will it cause the appearance? Hence the mind 
has no birth, nor docs the mind's vision have it. The person who perceives 
its birth will also perceive the fOJt-print in the sky (K.26-28). The 
mind and its object have no birth; the person who understands this 
fact will never fall in perversion (k.4-6). Dualism of subject and object 
appearance is the result of the mind's vibration, citta-spandita. The 
mind in fact is object-free; hence it is proclaimed to be contact-free, 
asanga (K.72) cpo k. 96. 
7. Samsara and Moksba. For samsara which is beginningless, no 
end can be achieved and for Release, moksha which has a beginning, 
no endlessness can be achieved (k.30)' As long as one has obsession 
with cause and effect so long he will have the causal production. The 
obsession being removed the causal production ceases to exist. As 
long as one is obsessed with the cause and effect, so long will his samsaric 
life continue; his obsession with the cause and effect being nmovcd he 
will not be caught in samsara (K.H-~6). 
8. Ksbanti. All entities are by nature freed from decay and death. 
Those who conceive their decay and death are dropped from their goal 
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due to their wrong conception (K. 10). All entities are beginning-
less and to be understood as similar to sky by nature. All entities 
by nature are confirmed as enlightened from the beginning; one who 
has persev~rance to this effect will become worthy of immortality 
(Kk.9 1 -9 2). 
9. Sasvata-ucchedtt·drshti. Everything is born in the empirical 
plane of existence, hence they are not permanent. Everything is 
un born as they exist (for all time), hence they are not annihilated (K. 17) . 
From a magic seed springs up the magic sprout, then the latter is neither 
permanent nor impermanent. The same rule is to be applied in respect 
of all entities (K. 59). No talk of eternal or non-eternal is pos£ible 
with reference to the unborn things. Where no letters (i.e. words) 
are applicable, no discrimination (of permanent or impermanent) can 
be applied thereto (K.60). 
10. Advaya, non-dual. Consciousness which is in fact unborn, un-
moving, object-free, calm and non-dual appears as though haVing birth 
movement and object (k.H). Everything is unborn; its birth is a 
vision of our mind. The mind being causeless, its non-birth, anut-
patti is invariably non-dual (k. 77). The mind being retreated and 
inactivated, its status is motionless; this state which is invariable, unborn 
and non-dual becomes the sole domain of Buddhas, the enlightened 
sages (k. 80). 
11. KaJpita and Paratantra. What exists in the imaginary sphere of 
existence (samvrti) does not exist in the absolute sense. Something 
may, perhaps, exist from 1 he viewpoint of empirical law of causation, 
that too does not exist in the absolute sense. The absolute may be 
unborn from the viewpoint of imaginary spheres of existence. KaJpita-
samvrti, it is not at all unborn in the absolute. It takes birth from the 
view point cf empirical law of causation (kk. 73-74). 
12. Abhinivesa. There is adhelence to a false idea of dualism, but 
that dualism is not there. Realizing the absence of dualism one takes 
no birth as he has no cause for the birth (k.75). The mind on account 
of adherence to false idea of dualism, activates itself in an apparently 
'similar object (e.g. the idea of silver on the nacre) but when one realises 
the absence of the mistaken o~ject he retreats himself from it and becomes 
detached from it (K.79). 
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13. Catuskoti. By apprehending some or other object the noble 
Atman is perpetually concealed as being happy, but disclosed as being 
miserable. The ignorant encompasses Him in four attributes; Ens, 
non-Ens,both Ens and non-Ens and neither Ens nor non-Ens, which attri-
b "f f. 'd . d" d ".. d" d" h b utes slgm your 1 eas m or er: unstea y , stca y an tea sence 
of both". These are four extreme points by which the noble Atman 
is perpetually concealed. The person who recognizes Him as being 
untouched by these attributes becomes omniscient (Kk.,82-84). 
14. Laukika, Suddha-laukika and Lokottara-jnana. The empircal know-
ledge (laukika-jnana) is what consists of two : object and its experience; 
pure empirical knowledge is what has the phenomenon of experience 
but is deprived of its object. The transcendental knowledge (Iokottara) 
is considered as what is deprived of both the object and its experience. 
The Fnlightened Sages, Buddhas have always proclaimed that the knowledge 
and the knowable (jnana, Jneya) are to be understood well. When the 
three-fold knowledge and the knowable ale understood in their order 
the wise will acquire omniscience in respect of everything (Kk.87-89). 
Those whoever are convinced in respect of birthlessness and identity 
(of all things) are indeed possessed of the highest knowledge in the world 
and in this fact the world docs not delve (K.95). 
15. Aerayana. What is to be discarded, what is knowable, what 
is to be acquired and what is to be matured are an to be understood 
from the Agrayana, the highest Upanishadic path. Of these the ignorance-
oriented experience has been accepted in the three states except in the 
cognizable-Turya state (K.9o). 
16. Brahmanya. Having reached to the complete ommsclence, 
Brahmanhood, and a non-dual position not amenable to the beginning 
middle and end, what more than this one may yearn for? This discipline 
of Brahmans is spoken of as their innate calm state. It is also stated as 
dama hecause they by nature are controlled in their senses; the wise-
knowing thiswise should acquire the calm state (Kk. 8 5-86). 
17. Vaisaradya. Having realized truly the absence of causation 
and not finding any distinct cause for anything one secures the fearless 
state which is devoid of grief and desire (K. 78). All entities are calm 
from the beginning, unborn, very quiet by nature and undifferentiated; 
their identity (samya) is unborn (i.e.Brahman) and fearless, visarada. 
Those who walk in things' defferentiation have no fearlessness. All 
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different doctrines are deeply bent on differentiations; therefore they 
are pitiable (Kk. 93-94-). Having realized the state which is hardly 
visible, too deep, unborn, undifferentiation, fearle"s and freed from 
diversity, we salute our preceptor to the best of our ability (K. I 00). 
lB. Avarana. If there is even a subtle notion of diversity ot' 
things lingering in his mind the unwise will have no detacheme'nt. 
What to speak of that he will slip away his veil of nescience? All dharmas 
(Le. sentient beings) are never covered by any v~il, free from impurities 
by nature, enlightened and liberated from the outset-thus understand 
our teachers (Kk.97-9B). 
19. Jnanam na hamata. Buddha's knowledge does not cross over 
into entities, nor do the entities likewise cross over into knowledge 
-this has not been declared by (Gautama) Buddha (K.99). Theunborn 
knowledge is not regarded to be crossing over into unborn entities. 
Since the knowledge does not cross over into entity it is declared as 
relation-free (K.96 Cp.72 under the head 6). 
20. Asparsa-Y08a. I salute to him who has preached yoga freed 
from contact, which is pleasant and beneficial to all sentient bdngs, 
dispute-free and contradiction-free (K. 2), cpo 1lI, 39: the contact-free 
yoga is hardly experienced by any meditator who is frightened from this 
yoga thinking that is dreadful, though it is in fact otht:rwise. 
Comment. 1. Ajativada. This is the most characteristic 
feature of Gauda's philosophy. Nagarjuna (hereafter referred as Naga) 
too has made lise of this thesis as one of the most powerful weapons to 
uphold his favourtie philosophy of Nihilism, Sunyavada. Though Gauda 
and Naga concur in pleading very strongly for non-origination of things 
their ultimate purpose is quite different. Gauda by declaring the separate 
. non-existence or non-origination of things aims at upholding Atman or 
Brahman as one sole principle, Advaita. Whereas Naga aims at an absolute 
voidness, sunyata. Though our modern mind tends to identify them as 
one and the same neither Gauda would say that he aims at voidness, nor 
would Naga say so at the Upanishadic. Brahman. They differ thus in 
their purposes which oppose each other. 
The circumstances which led them to their different conclusions 
must also be different. Since Gauda cites on several occasions instances 
from the Upanishads and other Vedic sources we may fairly be sure that 
he has been inspired by those sources. We find in the Upanishads several 
passages to the effect that one Atman or Brahman alone is true and other 
phencmenal things are untrue or false; e.g. Aitarcya. Up. 1,1,1: 
3TTC'IH crT ~~'l~ aTHfTCf ;;l"lfCf fops::q;r f~Cf I 
Br. Up III, 5", I: ~;; ~~ ~~ arCf) Sf'lfC{ ayl~lt I' When 
things other than Brahman are declared untrue they deserve to be 
termed non-existent and their apparent existence and appearance are 
to be explained away as the effects of our mind's illusion like a notion 
of the serpent on the rope. When the notion of the serpent disappears 
on a close observation the serp.>nt and the rope become one and the same 
and the serpent has not a separate existence. Likewise to say that things 
other than Brahman are untrue and false implies that they have no "separate 
existence and to be viewed as identical with Brahman itself. To confirm 
this idea the Sveta. Upanishad says:-
This Brahman that remains always within is knowable. 
There is nothing other than this Brahman realizable. 
The enjoyer, enjoyable and commander: 
All these three are stated to be this Brahman alone. I. I 2. 
On the basis of this identity all the attributes that are applicable 
to Brahman can also be applied to other phenomenal things. This is 
the reason why Gauda declares that things (dharmas) are adi-santa, adi-
buddha and adi-mukta (serene, released and enlightened from the outset) 
etc. The most characteristic of all attributes is aja, ajata 'unborn'. 
Upanishads always prefer the expression: aja, ajata, na jayate, etc. to 
qualify Brahman or Atman. It may now appear quite obvious why 
Gauda generally calls phenomenal things as aja, ajata, ajati, etc. This 
is perhaps the background on which Gauda's ajati-vada has been 
worked out. 
In the case of Naga's ajati or anutpattivada non-origination 
proposition the follOWing facts may be considered as basis: Asvajit, 
one of the foremost disciples of Buddha, has credited his master with 
the discovery of a true cause of things that are brought about by causes 
,in this stanza: 
~ ~ ~g$l W« . ~~ ~f ~¥WRr) ~n{ , 
"Tathagata (-Buddha) has proclaimed the true cause of things 
that arise on account of their causes" (v. Salistamba sutra, p.26, 
note On p. 3 I more particulars about the stanza). 
It is called there as Pratitya-samutpada~gatha implying thereby a formula 
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of Dependent Origination. The fonnula is said to contain twelve 
members such as AVidya, Samskara, Vijnana and others arranged in a 
progressive order to the effect that the first member causes the second, 
the second causes the third and the latter causes the fourth and so on. 
The formula explains how a human being comes into existence from its 
embryonic stage to a full grown up stage. In other words it makes 
plain how the truth of origin of misery, Samudaya- satya operates. The 
same formula is said to lead to the cessation-truth, nirodha-satya by a 
cessation process, i.e. the cessation of the first member leads to that of the 
second memb~r and so on. This doctrine obViously proves that both 
the origin and cessation are conditioned by causes. The law of causation, 
Pratitya-samutpada, thus forms a central theme in early Buddhism explaining 
how the phenomenal world originates and how it ceases to originate 
at the end. 
This position turns to be quite different when Buddhism assumes 
Mahayanic form and introduced a monistic teaching. The Madhyamikas 
headed by Naga and a large number of Mahayana Sutras credited no more 
Buddha to be the discoverer of the law of causation in its early form. 
The doctrine of Pratitya-samutpada implies for Naga the reverse of origina-
tion, i.e. non-origination and non-cessation. Note the first stanza of this 
Madhyamaka Sastra: 
arftRt\olif~T<i . . . .. <r: srcirC'lf~~I<i ..... .. I 
~~1I11J~ ~~: ~ q;:~ q'i'{6r' q~ II 
This idea of non-origination is confirmed in the Mahayanic 
scripture: q: q~lf!j:;rf£ffcr « ~:;rRf: I "What is originated 
through causes is not originated in fact' ' (cited in the Madh. vrtti, p. 239 
from the Anavatapta Sutra). The reversal of origination into non-
origination was necessitated in view of changing pattern of the Madhayamikas' 
outlook in respect of universe and their declared monistic principle. 
Now the Pratityasamutpada gatha has no more its original value, it has 
been since then relegated to an obsolete position. Gauda has also noticed 
this Gatha and its principal idea of origination (v.IV, 58). 
Thus once a monistic principle becomes a declared motto, a 
nihilistic attitude towards other things is inevitable. This background 
offered Naga a great opportunity to weild his critical acumen and demolish 
the entire structure of dualistic thinking solely of his co-religionists, 
Abhidharmikas, Sarvastivadins and Vaibhasika. His polemics against 
these schools are met with in his Madhyamaka sastra and Dvadasamukha 
etc. Naga being the foremost in the field of dialectic logic, the pattern 
30 
of his critique would not have but served as model to the monistic 
thinkers like Gauda. Though Gauda and Naga plead for non-origination 
theory we should not however, over look their fundamental differences. 
As w<" clearly noticed Naga upholds Sunyavada whereas Gauda advocates 
Advaita-vada. The latter's criticism of origination is directed against 
the Sankhyas in the main (Kk. 3-22). cpo ~ \jfrf~~;:~· •..... 
... 
== Satkaryavada; the Vaiseshikas' asatkaryavada is discussed only in one or 
two places (K.3 c-d, etc). Law of Causation Karana-karya-vada is 
the central theme of all dualists and has been cril icised on several 
occasions (Read verses under topic No. 6,7: citta, etc and samsara, etc). 
The origination theory of the early Buddhists as stated in the Pratitya-
samutpada-gatha has been referred to and rediculed, read IV. 58: 
~f ~ .f~ ~ij- ij- if ~:, with the gatha: q- ~ll~~T ~ am 
~'ff1lm ~r\{ , 
As previously remarked Naga's target of attack in upholding the 
non-origination theory is in the main the early Buddhist who followed 
the Pratitya-samutpada-gatha closely in letter. His criticism against 
the Sankhyas and the Vaiseshikas can be found in the Dvadasa-mukha 
(my translation, ch. II). It is a well-known fact that the Madhyamikas 
profess no proposition of their own; they simply ridicule the opponents' 
propositions efr. Vigrahavyavartani, ver. 29, and Madh, vrtti, p.16 
with Aryadeva's citation. To the question whether Sunyavada, Nihilism 
is adhered to Naga replies an emphatic no. He declares eloquently: 
V~~ if ((~~l[fqf~ ((l '+r~ , 
aql[' if),,~f~ !>llf~tf 9; ifi~ II 
"It is not stated as void or non-void, nor is to be stated as both 
or non-both; it is howevel stated as void in order to convey an 
empirical understanding" 
M. Sastra, XXII, II. 
Likewise an exclusive ajati or anutpada theory is not acceptable 
to Naga, efr. this point in his Dvadasamukha, ch. I. later portion. Gauda 
on the other hand sticks to the non-origination doctrine throughout the 
treatise and hints sometime that ajati or ajata slands for Brahman or 
Atman. We should not nevertheless miss to take note of some common 
expression between Gauda and Naga. Read e.g. Gauda's verse. 
~ err q«it ((ffcr if rer;f~ ilT<rlf I 
9«<tffi«~U;:rN if rlifir ...... ~ ~ II 
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with Naga's if ~cra) iffflf q-m'if i:n'-:lff iflt~ga: I 
~~T ~~ fcrwa '$fIerr: fj>:q.; ~=qif II 
M. 
if ~1: ifmor if ~flHr~ 'C{q-l fifcre q~T I 
cti~ f;:rc(;:rctiT ~~ ~fa f~ 3:;lfa II 
Sastra 1, I. and 
Ibid, I,7. 
2. Prajnapti and Paratantra. Our reading of these verses m:ay 
not be very satisfactory as they are shrouded in unfo.milior expressions 
which are not understandable by our ordinary intellect. Cauda has 
employed here apparently some Buddhist expl essions like Prajnapti and 
Paratantra. Though the latter term can be tnced in the treatises of the 
Sankhya and Sankara the former can hardly be traced in the Brahmanical 
literature. It appears therefore that Cauda adopted it from the Buddhist 
sources and made it of his own. The Buddhists employ the term praj-
napti in the sense of ordinary talk or philosophically an empirical realm 
of existence, V. Satya-siddhi, ch, on this topic and cpo also Pudgala-
prajnapti, Loka-jnapti, etc, which are some of the titles in Buddhist 
literature. Its synonym in later Buddhism is Samvrti-satya, empirical 
truth. 
Paratantra is also Buddhist expression conveying the idea of 
origination dependent on causes and conditions. In Yogacara Buddhism 
the term conveys the sense "the mind and mental states dependent 
on causes and conditions" . In fact it is not at all a Buddhist term when 
it signifies anything that depends on some ultimate cause in COIttrast with 
which is independent, Svatantra. For example, the evolutes in Sankhya 
system are paratantra because they are evolved from Prakrti which is 
svatantra because if does not evolve from anything else (v. Sankhyakarika, 
10). Sri Sankara also employs paratantra in connection with our body, 
karya-karana-sanyhata ;, the aggregates of effects and senses" . So Cauda's 
sense is quite obvious, viz. paratantra, causal product i.e., the samsaric 
process continues and persists until samklesa, defiling forces are present. 
It is an established fact in every system of thought that the defilipg forces 
necessarily give rise to their effects, i.e., samsaric life an empirical exis-
tence. 
In the next verse the author speaks of Yukti-darsana and bhuta-
darsana. The first is concerned with the empirical experiences and 
their conditioning factors whereas the latter with the absolute. Bhuta-
Jarsana, an insight into the absolute truth .turns out the conditioning 
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factors into non-factors. The term bhuta-darsanam looks like a Buddhist 
expression, note Asvaghosha's stanza: 
~~ ~al W +ra~1 rqll~~ II 
"Perceiver of Truth, perceiving the Truth as Truth becomes released!1 
cited in Naga's Pratitya-samutpada-hrdaya, Bullet jon rj Tibetolo8), 
Vol. V: 2. from the Saundarananda. 
3. Dream. Example on dream analogy read our remarks on 
ch.n (beginning). The only point to be noticed here is aCiny.:a, "un-
thinkable". This term is again spoken of in connection with the uni-
verse of subject and object in K.47 and 51. Read comment on the fire-
brand example, topic nO.5. 
4. ,11a),a, etc. Maya example is common to both Buddhism' 
and Vedanta. Nirmitaka example is moot likely a Buddhist one. Sankara 
however, refers to the i!=1ea of a magician creating himself as ,HIking in 
air etc. : lj~ l1flJl<rT f'i~qT<{f'i orl~l.,i:rq···:···· 3ffiIijili'i ifC~r;;;rq 
f.ffi:mT~ I (Aitareya. Up.bhashya, Gita Press, p.37). The important 
verse to be noted here in this section is Gauda' s refutation of 
Buddha's renowned Gatha on Pratityasamutpada doctrine. Gauda says 
that Buddha's teaching on the origination of things has not been stated 
from the absolute point of view. The origination of those things resem-
bles a magic act which by itself is unproved as existent. Read comment 
on jati-vada for more details. 
5. Fire:brand.· This is a 'well-knmvn example in Indian phi-
losophical literature. The whirling fire-brand causes the appearance 
of whed which is unthinkable, acintya, became it does not exist in the 
fire-brand, nor does it come from the outside or go out of the fire-brand. 
The wht~d-appearance is unthinkable, because .t ,s not a subs1ance, i.e .. 
it cannot be regard.ed as the actual effect of the fire-brand. Likewise 
the appearance of the subject-object universe on th~· consciousness is 
1.1l1thinkable, because th~ said appearance is not a substance; hence there 
canr,ot be a causal relation between the appearance and consciousness 
'ihi<fir~l1faRl)rrTq:. [t seems that Gauda expounds the Vedantic idea 
in the Yogacara Bud.dhist terminology. 
Our author or{ a previous occasion has also spoken of the unthink-
able in K.44· Tl-.e person with waking state perceives, as a result of 
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perversion, the unthinkable external elements as real (bhuta), etc. 
Ref. Dream-example NO.3. Here foc Gauda, the phenomenal universe 
is unthinkable, because it is an imposed appearance on Brahman like the 
wheel appearance on the fire-brand. The wheel appearance is neither 
a substance nor the effect of the fire-brand. Likewise phenomenon of 
universe is neither substance nor the effect of Brahman but it is un-
thinkable (acintya): magic or false. There cannot be a causal relation 
between the universe and Brahman because the universe is not at all 
a substance. 
The idea of unthinkable is also common to the Yogacara Buddhists. 
The Ratnagotra, thus refers to four unthinkable acintya: Samala Tathata, 
Nirmala Tathata, Vimala Buddhaguna and Jina-kriya. Here acino/a 
appears to signify their characteristics inexplicable in the terms of or-
dinary reasoning. 
The Satya-siddhi again defines the sense organ as acino/a-karma-
balarupa of the four great elements. It is acino/a because it cannot 
be stated as either one with or other than the four great elements. 
According to Dignaga the sense organ is a sort of Sakti inherent in the 
Alaya consciousness. He also refers to it alternately as anirde':}'a-rupa, 
probably an opinion of the S. Siddhi (v. my Alambanapariksha, ver.7-8). 
The Madhyarnika's doctrine of voidness which may be posited 
as a parallel of Vedantin'sdoctrine of Il1usion, mayavada appears to have 
sprung up as a result of their speculation about things in their indescrib-
able character. The Madhyamikas affirm that the phenomenal world is 
indescribable because it does not stand their logical test. We have seve-
ral reasons to make us believe that the movement of the Madhyamika 
analysis was not started with Naga but it must have been initiated from 
the early period of the Mahayana scriptures. We may cite here a few 
examples. The Bhavasankrantisutra says: The consciousness of next 
new birth is something indescribable. The last consciousness when it 
ceases, does not go anywhere and the first consciousness, when it arises 
does not come from anywhere else. For, they have no reality of their 
own and are void of their self. substance (pp.4, I 5). It may now be 
plain that the relation between these two el :-ments of consciousness not 
be spcHied in terms of logic. The idea is that the same consciousness 
does not cross over to the new birth and continues for the time 
(na samkramati). The same position is confirmed in the Salistamba-Sutra 
dealing with the Pratitya-samutpada doctrine, p,6, Na Samkrantitah " 
The Madh. vrtti (p. I 2 I) cites a Mahayanic sutra bearing on this topic: 
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~off;n:)"l~~ fc(~r;f :a'fTGTlIcp:i fqtf~frr I 
~ Cfif~f'iif iRf;; :q arTiRf ~lImlftq+( ti')frr qlL<frer II 
The indescribable character of the relation between the cause 
and the effect has been argued by Naga in several places as a basis of his 
Sunyata doctrine. He pleads for example:-
mltflr ~'lTcrfu ~fl{ i:ffcf~ era I 
" :qr~fq Clq, erfJtTq ;:ftf:ow-r ;;rfq ~r~ II 
M. Sastra XVIII, I 0 
Cp.M.vrtti, p.239 citation from the Anavatapta Sutra: 
<f: ~4"3fTQfcr ~ {!1~m) 
,,) Cf~ ~T~ ~qliTqC1)sfffl I 
~: Sh::-lIlIl~'I ij"!J..'~ ~) 
~: ;rr;:~ \5.n;;fi:f ij")~+('ff: II 
'" This topic will continue in the comment on Sasvata, etc. NO.9. 
6. Citta and artha. Naga introduces in his sastra chap, III. on 
a critical examination of sensory perception which leads him to the 
conclusion that none of the senses could possibly discharge its function 
w:th which concurs Gauda's contention that the mind does not contact 
with its object, etc. It is worthwhile to take note of the verse from the 
Bhavasankranti-Sutra: 
" "'~: ~ ~~ !Vi) ~t'i" ~fi1:q I 
Q;~ 'f~1i ~~q' <f9f ~Cfi) ;:; ;rT~a- II 
" Cited i,) M. vrtti, p. 120. 
Gauda's statement that the person who conceives the origina-
tion of things will see the footprint in the sky is comparable with the 
verse cited in Madh. vrtti p. 90 : ~lIfq~;:;% fcr~ iFf:q 3R'f~~ 
~~ qr ~ I (Ratnakarasutra) cpo also 31lCfilWf ~~ 
rr~ ~ ~lffCf I Dhammapada, VII, 4- and Theragatha, 92. Sankara also 
cite:> the simile along with others: ~ ifi ~~q 'iifiCiq ~~fu I 
ij")qlrO+rCf :q q~lJtqR)~' \jf~ ~ 'iif +(T;:;t;;j ~n:t~f 'C( f~~~ I 
Aitareya bhashya. p. 76-71 (Gita Press). Here Gauda might 
have in his mind the Yogacara Buddhists who hold that the mind though 
momentary continues in succession. 
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Citta-spandita (ver. 72). The vibration of the mind has already 
been spoken of in III, 29 as being happened in dream as well as in the 
waking state on account of maya. The Buddhists also speak of the minds 
no ding as resulting in false assumption. Buddha says: I notion is the mind's 
noding, vibration and elaboration, etc. (Samyutta, IV, 202- J cited also 
in S. Siddhi, ch, 84). Note also the passage cited in Madh. vrtti p. HO 
1. I 2: f;;qfurf+rfcr lflTC{'llJ: q~+{: rififfiffiT<iTWRfa-: ~f~'i:f~mf+{f:;::q­
a-T;;(l( Ii "Nirvana is a pacification and stoppage of all causing factors 
and of all distraction and shaking". This idea may quite possibly tally 
with Gauda's conception of the universe as a vibration of the mind. 
7. Samsara and Moksha. Gauda makes cle~r here that he keeps the 
same attitude towards Samsara as Naga. and his predecessors maintain. 
They plead that the belief and adherence to law of causation lead» to 
a great sequence of one being bogged down in a turbulent empirical life. 
The best meat's to get rid of it is to be detached from the false notion 
of causation law. The causation law is false because it falls to the ground 
when it is put to a critical analysis. The Madhyamika dt~clares that 
things that are valued on the basis of causal relations are absolutely 
valueless arid hence void, sunya. Gauda and his followers as a r~sult 
of the same logical absurdity call the empirical things as maya or acintya. 
Things are acintya unthinkable because their causal relations are impossi-
ble to be made satisfactorily agreeable to our reasoning. Gauda has as a 
speciman, shown how absurd is to talk about the causal relation in 
respect of the fire-brand and its wheel like appearance (Y. Comm. NoS). 
Naga. has on the side of Mahayana Buddhism done the same task through-
out his Madh. Sastra. 
8. Kshanti. This concept is much favoured by the Buddhists and 
found in a specific context, cpo Jnana-kshanti in Buddhism. Gauda seems 
to have generelized the term in a border sense of perseyerance. How 
the entity are free from decay and birth, beginningless and enlightened 
by nature have already been made plain in the comment on Ajativada 
No. L Their comparison with sky is also common to the Buddhists. 
The comparison implies that the entities are identical and changeless, 
and in addition, they are void for the Madhyamikas. For the Mahayanic 
idea ofkshanti read the Samadhiraja Sutra: 
The Bodhisattva does not dispute with anybody nor does he 
talk about any purpcseless topic and remains constantly in his 
objective and dharma; this is the description of the first kshanti. 
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He understands all things as comparable with maya and grasps 
no nimitta. The characteristic marks of the perc<.:ived 
object, nor does he run astray from his cultivated knowledge. 
These are specifications of the first kshanti. (v. Buddhagama .. 
sangha, p. 238). 
9. Sasvata and Uccheda. Buddha's doctrine is based on the middl(': 
path, madhyamapratipad avoiding t,V"o extreme ends: afflicting onc self 
with the bodily tortme and indulging in the sensuous pleasure (v. 
Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta) which (:-.nds are ~\:ated later as existence 
and non-existt:mce (Samyutta,IlI, 155 cited in S. Sicldhi, cb. 26. ]\;0. 315). 
The Mahavastu equated bhava-drshti (+lTq£:fl!) with Sasvata and 
vibhavadrshti (fi:r1H:t£:fl!) with llccheda (v. Poussin, M. vrtti, p. I, n. 4-
and p.)]2,5). Naga then declared that Buddha's doctrint~ 
freed from eternalism al.d Nihilism (Sasvatocheda-drsti in his Madh. 
sa"tra XVIII, II-Buddha introd',iccd Pratitya-sanmtpada, law of causation 
with a view to a\oiding the two ends, so says a Sutra: "The view of 
non-existence (Nihilism) disappears when one understands the origin 
of things (Samudaya-satya) and the view of existence (Etemalism) disappears 
when one understand" their cessation, f-..'irodha-satya" (Samyutta, Ill, 
T H cited in S.Siddhi ch. 19Q ) Naga comments: The law ef cam-ation 
helps to avoid those two flaws in the doctrine. 11t, says: Whichever 
arises due to causes and conditions i!' neither id'.:ntical with nor different 
from its cause; hence it is neither perished nor preserved (M. Sastra 
XVIII, 10 cpo comm. No. 5 aboye). The Salistamba Sutra states that 
the formula of causation should be viewed on the background of five 
aspects, the first two of which aTe: na sasvata and na uccheda and 
explaim; them in the same fashion as Naga does v. verse cited about). 
The Lalitavistara also expresses similar view: ;jfr'Jf~ «Clr lf~r~) ., 
:q tTl ~r'l ~~q ~~r I i'f:q aF1! ClCIl ., :;:fq CJq ~C(q;l"'~({ 3fl!TT~~qCJT II 
"For example, the sprout springs up from the seed; they are neither 
one and the same nor different from each other; thus their nature is 
neither permanent nor imperm'inent" (cited in M. Yl'tti p. 377). 
Aryadeva elucidates the topic in a simpler llHnller: Because an 
element comes into being there is no Nihilism. Because an element goes 
out of existence there is no Etemalism (Cited Ibid, p. 3]6). 
Being enamc,ured of this grand idea of the Buddhists Gauda thinks 
his Advaita doctrine should also be made freed from these two flaws. 
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So he says: Because things take birth, i.e. change into another form in the 
empirical sense, they are not permanent; but because they are in fact 
unborn, i.e. do not change in their aspect of existence an inherent 
Brahamanic state, they are eternal. Gauda's statement: "In regard 
to unborn things no talk is possible of 'eternal' or 'noneternal' (K.60) 
may be compared with Naga's verse: With reference to void tUngs what 
is the same, what is different, what is eternal and what is non-eternal. .. 
(XXV, 22). Note the difference between Gauda and Naga in their 
metaphysical outlook: for the former' 'things are unborn" and for tht, 
I " h' 'd" atter t mgs arc VOl . 
Gauda next says (60 e-d) Where no letters are applicable, no 
discrimination is possibly applicable thereto, which saying implies that 
Truth is anakshara, inexplicable in letter; cpo Naga' s idea: Anaksharam 
Tattvam. Discrimination is rooted in letters: words; cpo the following 
idea: sources of discrimination are words and the latter is the source of 
the former, fqiifi~ql.f);::p:r: :(Fi~T fqiifi~qT: ~~:, 
Gauda's expression: illusory things create illusory things; like-
wise are the phenomenals things (K.59) is comparable with Naga's 
verse: void things arise from the void things: ~rlt';!t ~q f~ ~T 
'Cllfi: snlqf,:a erll''+l,f: , Pratitya-samutpada-hrdaya, vcr. 4. 
10. Advaya. Gauda seems to ~peak of the individual Atman by 
vijnana (which is identical with Brahman) when he refers to it as motionless 
and without second. The consciousness appears in the empirical plane 
of existence as though having birth, motion, etc. The idea may be 
compared with Dharmakirti's saying. : arfcnHiTr f~ ~t=;qy 
~fu6~;if: I lXr~~;H~lfi;JTqfu~crrf~ ~~~, Pra. var..3. 354 
Gauda says (K. 77) that the mind's non-birth anutpatti, is advaya 
and that the non-birth state is possible when there is no nimitta, mind's 
activating cause, pravrtti-nimitta. At this state the mind becomes One 
with Brahman, Brahmi-bhava (v. our comment on III, KK.35, 46 above 
and Yogasutra I, 1, 2). The same idea is expressed in a different fashion 
(K. 80), i.e. the motionless state which is the same as Brahmic non-dual 
positon is declared to be the sole domain of Buddha's highest kno·wledge. 
Here "Buddha" is in a general sense meaning an enlightened sage. v. 
our remark on advaya in ch. II, end). 
1 I. Kalpita and Paratantra. Those two verses are the most 
enigmatic and misunderstood. The terms Kalpita and Paratantra are the 
yogacara expressions adopted by Gauda and grafted to his Vedantic 
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ideology. Before we try to understand them ,,,e have to bear in mind 
the following background. Mahayana Buddhists admit two kinds of 
samvrti : Tathya and Mithya-samvrti. For examplt>, the sight of "\'att~r 
in the mirage is supplanted in the next moment on a close observation. 
Here the sight of water is Mithya-samvrti. and the observation of the 
mirage is TathJa-samvrti (v. my paper: Madhyamakartha Samgraha in 
JORM, IX, p. 353). Gauda's kalpita sanwrti corresponds to Mithya-
samvrti (efr. Ibid, ver. 9) and Paratantra to TathJa. Sam Le. /e>kasamvrti or-
satya. Kalpita-sam. is the imagined water in the mirage and the 
Paratantra-sam is the experience cf the wordly objects which are pr:lducts 
of causation law. For the yogacara Buddhists kalpita ilspect is non-
existent and false and the paratantra aspect i.e. the mind and the mental 
state is existent and real. For the Madhyamikas it is also unreal and void. 
Now we can very well understand what Gauda means to convey in 
these two verses. In kalpita-samvrti i .c. in our sole imagination some-
tbing appears as if real, e.g. the water in the mirage, but it turns to be 
unreal in the Tathyasamvrti-Loka-vyavahara which Gauda calls Paratantra 
and which has a bit of reality (paramartha).The ohjective universe may 
be real from the viewpoint of the law of causation, Paratantra·Sam-Lokc-sam 
but it is unreal from the absolute point of view (K.73). The next 
must be understood thus: so called ultimate principle, Pradhana, etc. 
of other philosophers is conceived as unbcrn from the viewpoint of 
Kalpita-sam imaginary experience (Kalpita-sam- Mithya-sam) , but it is not 
unborn from the viewpoint of the highest Truth. It takes birth etc 
from the viewpoint of Paratantra-sam- TathJa-sam. Parat<wtra-sam is 
so called because the law of causation is admissible in the empirical 
plane. It is an intersting coincidence that Candrakirti too in his Madh. 
avatara illustratef Mithya-sam by quoting the Sankhya and others and 
their so-called ultimate principles (v. my paper; Madh. sangraha op. cit. 
p. 45). It is strange that the Bhashya on the verse attributed to Sankara 
interprets paratantra into parasastra (v. conun. NO.2. more about 
paratantra). In the light of above finding R.D. Karmarkar's much 
laboured explanation and note are not admissible (v. his notes on pp. 
13 0 - 33)· 
12. Abhinivesa. The first line of K. 75 is a citation from the 
Madhyanta-vibhaga of Maitreya ch. I, 1. vel', I a-b: 8T~CfTfflf;:fI~:iTsf~1j GCt 
~"fq~ff I Sthiramati comments: there is a foundation i.e. Paratantra-mind 
mental state and on it kalpita, false ideas is imposed in which (paratantra) 
exists no dual, subject and object, etc. \Ve an' not to understand 
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Cauda in this manner. He probably means: there is abhinivesa (wrong 
adherence) for abhuta-dvaita, dualism but there is no dualism in fact. 
]f we divide the verse into two sentences all the grammatical djfficulties 
would be saved? Th K. 79 makes plain that Caud.a does not intend to 
express the Buddhist meaning in k. 75 a-b because Ice ,:ays in this verse 
that on account of abhinivesa for false idea of dualism, abhllta a man engages 
himself in an apparently similar object. Here the subject of the verb 
'vinivartate' is 'sah' a person, not the mind. 
13. Catuskoti. This is the most characteristic feature of the 
Madhyamika philosophy. Naga eloquently proclairns that the higr,est 
Truth of his conception is fccc from any attribute: existence (,,' Jl011-
.;xistence de. He inherited this doctrine from Bml.dha's diS(Oln'S'.: to 
Aggivaccha about the Tathag,"',l's status aft(~r death which (status) has 
been described as 'hoti, na hoti' hoti ca na ca hoti, naiva na Loti na 
hoti'. Then Buddha gives out his opiH:o!1 about the poil,!' t1111~: : 
Tathagata in Nit'vana is immensurahle like the great ocenn (MajHmanikaya, 
NO.7 2). It is ther<'fore appropriate for the Madbyamikas to qualify d-:e 
Truth as free from existence etc; but (ouid it be justifit·d on the part 
of Cauda 'who is an Ad\aita Vedantin and whose ultin,ate truth is B.·ahman 
and essenti,;lly sat, existence in character? For this re,ison prohably 
Cauda states that the four attributes signify in order: unsteady, steady 
etc. Thus Cauda appears to refer hy <:.stivada, existence-thesis to the 
multiple principles of the dualists like the Sankhya, Vais(:shika and tl~e 
early Buddhists. Thdr principles heing more than one the existence 
trait does not remain attached to one principle. Forthe materialists 
(nastika) the highest principle being nil the non-existence tr,dt is fixe(l. 
The meaning of ubhaJa and ubhaJabhava may be understood appropriately 
in relation to other thesis in order. 
J 4. Laukika-jnana etc. The varieties of knowledge, lallkika, etc. arc 
are quite common to the yogacara Buddhists though their interpretations 
are sOHlewhat different. No di{lerl:nce can be noticed with reference to 
the first variety, viz. Laukika and its meaning hecause it is concerned 
with the ordinary ",aking experience. The difference is to be noted in 
the second variety, ie. Suddha-Iaukika. For the Buddhists ( : yogacara) 
it is a pure empirical knowledge which is the prastha-labdha-jnana, ie. 
a knowledge acquired subsequent to the concentration Samadhi and 
reflects things in their own nature namely as the reflections of the mind 
and the mental states, paratantra-aspcct. The Yogin alone would 
perceive the paratantra-trait through this knowledge after rising up 
from the samadhi, Lakottara, the higr.est tran;'C',ndental knowledge 
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known as A sTaY(1para Htti, i.e. state when Alav,l-con;ciousness is turned 
into Tathata, or Dharnl'.dhatu, etc (v. Trimsika, ver. 28-30). 
It appcilcs til;,t Gauda employs these apparently Buddhist terms 
to convey hb ovvn ideas. His commentator exphins the Suddhalaukika 
and Lokottara as d','cam state and deep sleep consciousness respectively. 
In t11,<; dream state the mind alone expt:riences unreal things; so it is 
without object.s there are experienccs-avostu sopalombha. In the deep 
sleep even the mind ceases to operate, hence it is considcred to be 
(:prive<l of both, objects and their experiences. 
The Lmkavatara Sutra speaks ofthe three kinds: Laukika, Lokottara 
and Lokottaratama and describes them as three stag\.;s of development. 
The first is related to other philo,ophers who ad\'Ocatc different ultimate 
categories of existence and non-existence. The second is concerncd 
with all sr::.vakas and pratyt·ka-Buddhas' knowledge and the third with 
Buddhas and Bodhisattva's developed knowledge (v. the text cited by 
Karmarkaf in his notes, p. 138). 
The second line of this K. 88 is the most ambiguous. The 
Bhashya of Sankara comments: The knowledge through 'which the ahove 
said three states an~ understood is knowable; cognizable, vijneya is known 
as the fomth state (turiyakhyam), the Absolute Truth ..... This interpreta-
tion appears to be somewhat unCt~rtain in the next verse. 89 which 
does not mention the fourth state in a plain language. The verse reads: 
When three-foltl knowledge and the knowable (jncya) are understood 
well in their order one becomes omniscient. According to thi"; Bhashya, 
Sarvajnata, 'omniscience' stands for the fourth state (v. the text cited 
in the notes, p. 14-0). So apparently th(~r,,~ is no incongruity on the part 
of Bhashya, so Karmarkar's criticism of Bhashya seems to be unfair. 
15. Agrc!yana. This term is also a Buddhistic expression meaning 
Mahayana, generally understood as great ychicle. According to the 
Upanishads yana menas "path" in the expressions like Devayana and 
Pitryana etc. In Buddhism there <,re three yanas: Hinayana, Pratyeka 
Bucldha-yana and Mahayana also called Agrayana sometime. On the 
Brahmanical side two yanas are well known, viz, Pitryana and Devayana 
(v. Br. Up. VI, 2,2, Prasna. I, 9 and Mundaka III, 1,6) which are concerned 
with the field of karman, Vedic rites and the worship of lower Brahman 
(upasana). It is most likely that Gauda accepted here as el ewhere 
the Buddhist expression, agrayana to convey his Vedantic idea i.e. the 
highest Upanishadic path. The Buddhists call Mahayana sometimes 
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Buddhayana. As its counterpart the Vcdantin may also call his path 
as Brahma-yana like Brahma-nirvana of the Gita, V, 24-26, II, 72). 
Now we have to explain the Heya etc on the basis of the Upanishads. 
Heya, 'to be abandoned' is apara vidya, knowledge of the lower Brahman 
(efr. Sankara's bhashya on Mundaka, I, 21). The knowable is paravidya, 
knowledge of higher order leading to Brahman-realization (v. ibid)' 
Or it may indicate the knowable first stated in the ver. 58 (v. comment 
on it above). Apya, "to be acquired" is the fruit effected by Karman, 
Samsaraphala (v. Bhashya on Mundaka I, 2,2: Safvam Karana-karyam 
utpadyam, apyam, samskaryam vikaryam va). Pakyam, 'to be matured' 
is the realisation of Atman and its identity with Brahman on thematura-
tion of one's intellect (v. Sankara's Bhashya on Taitti, I, 11, p. 90 Gita 
Press, cpo the expression, paJ:ya in Sveta. Up. V, 5" and Sankara's 
Aparokshanubhuti, ver. itqt Cff'Q: ~l~T qf~q£1l1 'if "r'Iij: I 
ff cf ~~at srHU .... , .. ·· II 133 II 
Here vrtti is Brahma-vrtti, thinking of Brahman. 
An illusory experience of these four may happen in all three 
states, Laukika, etc. (K. 88) except in the fourth vijneya state. This 
interpretation may sound well. But the difficulty we encounter here 
is that the interpretation clashes with Gauda's description of the third 
state, deep sleep as devoid of objects and their experiences. 
16. Brahman. va Gauda calls the Upanishadic omniscience a non-dual 
Brahmanhood (Brahmanya) probably in order to distinguish his Advaita 
doctrine from Buddhism. The Brhadaranyaka describes who is 
Brabmana and who is Krpana: lfT qr t:!;~an: ~fCff~ at~l1TC! ,,)cfit~ 
sr"'fa " iiq1Jf: ST~ Q' t:!;~ mfrlf fqf~T at~l1R! ~T<fil~5tf~ ~ ~: I 
(Ill, 8,10). It is worthwhile to remember here that a counter-claim 
has also been made by Buddha and his disciples. Their claim is that their 
faith alone leads to Brahmanhood, efr. Dhammapada, Brahmanavagga. 
26. and my paper, Message of Buddha and reference on pp. S-8, Prabud. 
dhabharata, 19 So, May. 
'7. Vaisaradya. This is also a Buddhist expression. It is one of 
the most important attributes of Buddha like Dasabala etc. The Satya-
siddhi state Buddha deserves our homage because he is superior to all 
other religious leac1.ers in respect of his sublime qualities like 
Va isaradya , etc. (ch. 3 and my paper on this subject in Sino Indian 
Studies, vol.I.pt. 3). Now Gauda appears to have generalized the expression 
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and claimed that the Realizer cf Brahman and Atman may also deserve to 
be characterized as 'Visarada' just like Buddha claiming to be Brahman. 
18. Avarana. This is a common concept of all schools of Indian 
philosophy though its content may differ in each school. The most 
characteristic feature of avarana, veil acceptable to the Vedantin and 
the Buddhist is aVidya, ne~cience which is amplified into Raga, dvesha 
and moha, 'lust, indignation and infatuation'. Gauda here speaks of 
no aVidya or maya but its effect, i.e, the notion of diversity in identity. 
Things, in fact, ar': free from veil, pure by nature, etc. Thus our 
leaders understand. (R,-'f. our comment on Ajati no. I). Hereagain 
a generalization of Buddha's epithet "Nayaka" has been. claime0 by 
Gaucla, cpo Amarasimha's synonyms of Buddha "Nayaka" and "Vinayaka". 
'9. Jnanam na hamate. Gauda state why knowledge does not cross 
over into entities in K. 96. Because both knowledge and entities are 
unborn, 'aja' and essentially of identical character of Brahman one 
does not cross over into other. The thing other than Brahman is 
a myth in the highest sense of Truth. This is the reason why the knowle-
dge is eloquently declared to be freed from any relation with its relata. 
Gauda has already stated that the mind never touches its object since the 
latter is unreal (K. 72). He now speaks aloud that this point has not 
been admitted by Buddha. Buddha on the other hand, proclaimed in 
his first sermon: In me a knowledge arose in respect of dharmas, 
entities: 'epf~ .r.:HFnf~ fCfIi.TT \3~qTf~; etc which claim has 
been challenged by Gauda in this verse, this challenge will ~et 
at rest all speculations about Gauda and his professed faith. 
20. Asparsa-yoga. This seems to be absolutely a new expression 
coined by Gauda. It has no parallel either in Buddhism or Brahmanism. 
It is a paradoxical combination joining, yoga in the absence of contact, 
sparsa. What does it signify? The classical definition of yoga in Buddhism 
is to concentrate one's mind on a particular object. This is definitely a 
sparsa-Y0ga. The Buddhists admit nine grades of dhyana: four rupa-
dhyanas: four arupa-dhyanas and the last: Nirodha-samapatti which 
is literally a sparsa-Y0ga. For in the previous 8 dhyanas the mind is 
op,=rating and engaged in one or other object; it is in the last samadhi 
the mind ceases to operate; the yogin has only the body to get into 
contact with the object, kayena sprstva viharati 'iiN;t ~~ f~ 
this is called sparsa vihara (Pali; phassa-vihara). This fact makes 
clear that Gauda's Asparsa-yoga is unknown to the Buddhists. 
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The Kathopanishad defines yoga as follows: When the fiv{~ 
s,"'nSllOllS knowledges together with mind cease to op{;rate and the intell-
ect too does not act, that ~.tate is the highest poc;ition (gati). That 
p()sltion is consideced as yoga in which th.?, senses induding the mind 
and the intellect m'e controlled and held up steadfast (III, 2, 10-1 I). 
This is the yoga that Gauda has in mind, Since in this state all the 
senses. the mimI and tl>: intellect cease to operak, there is nothing that 
comes into conta'(;t with any ohject. This positk.n m<'y appropri;:tely 
he termed" Asparsa-Y0na". Sankara's remarks in this context are note-
worthy. He says: ffilfTt:a'f Q~'ff~ l{mflffcr q;:l{;:a- fql{T'lite{ ij";:C'fl\ I ij"CfT-
;:p:!l{);rfcp:ftlf~&1OfT ~Tl{lfq~"T tilflf;;: I (Katha. Bhashya, Gita press, p. 160) 
"That such wise state the wise consider as the yoga which in fact is only 
a disjoining (viyoga) i.e. contact-free, because this state of yogin, ~"int 
is characterzed as an absence cf contact with all sorts of evil dfa.irs". 
This statement of Sri Sankara makes it quite obviolls that the yog<'_ descrl-
hed in tht: Upanishad here is truly Asparsa-yo8a of Gauda. 
Let us see whether the Gita sheds any light on this topic. The 
following passage probably helps us a good deal to resolve the riddle: 
qrwftf~q; 3J~mFlfT fif;:~flfr~lff;; l{1'!: ~1Sli:( , 
ij" ~~f1:r)~FlfT ~q~qJlir" ~ II 
"The yogin who being detached from tr.e external touchables 
obtains the happiness in his self; he is merged in Brahma-yoga 
and expcri...:.)ccs tht: inexhaustible happiness". 
This stanza amply demonstrates that Gauda's Asparsa-yoaa is no 
other than Brahma-Y0aa of ' the Gita. The expression, Asparsa-yoaa 
with reference to Brahma-Y0aa is the most applOpdate, since Brahman 
being identical with th·e yogin's Atman, self !-:as no contact even of the 
minutest degree could be imagined. 
21. Avivada and AY·ir~ddha. Buddha has stated on several occasions 
that he does not dbpute with the world and that he follows what the 
ordinary people talk about the worldly affairs (v. Samyutta, III, 138, 
Majh. l. and S. Siddhi, ch. 3, p. 12), 
Gauda likewise says that we approve quite happHy the thesis of 
no-birth, ajativada which results from the quarrelsome di.spute elaborated 
by other schools of thought about satkarya and asatkarya etc (IV, 5'). 
Naga would not concur with Cauda in this respect because the former 
44 
could not havc any dogma of his ow" as a settlc(J fact, hence he disputes 
nery dogma of his opponents. 
Sri Silnkar,' is more eloquent in disclosing lh,' Advaitin's attitude 
towards the controH;rsial issues set forth hy other philosoph(~rs. Note 
his statements cited below: 
a{(ffcFJ1ij'lf1Tlfll' ~t;:~l~~itifi~G:~' 5\ fa 31Ti{'(Cf,a-t +i+i&rcf: ~f~ 
~T~<fi+fCTG:'lqll~qfif f<fif:;;::q~:e~ 3!"Hnfif: ;:; ~ cnf<fi<fiCfq: a:nn:q~tJT I 
~~a(ffil~~ -fcr<:rG:~f~ f;:;f~l:i f~)~){i:q'f H 1lT11, I 
a-: ~~f~~~~f;[: ~@' f;rqlfa ~ II 
"Tberefore the person desirous of ReL:ase, discarding the logi-
cian's system should tilke good care in respect of the doctrine 
of identity of Atman-Brahman. For this reason, we shall dis-
close son~e lapses in their systems but not heing entangled in 
the systems. The follovving has b\-'Cn stated in this context: 
The Vedantin placing the entire hurd(;n of points of disputes, 
their origin and causes upon 1 he disputants and being protect{;d 
by them in our decision ahout the thesis of existence passes on 
pcacdullyand happily". (Prasna-Bhashya V1d,Gita Press p.1 1 I) 
Note on the last verse. Gauda pays homage to his preceptor 
though not expn:ssed, after understanding and realizing the fearless 
deep and undifferentiated state cf peac~ in order to show his gratitude 
to his pre-:eptor. Th is is quite in keeping with the tradition deserved 
in the Upanishads, e.g. Prasna. Up. last verse, Mundaka and Brah. Up etc. 
A similar tradition is noticeable 011 the Buddhist side e.g. Sundarananda 
where Nanda acknowledges his gratitude to Buddha. Naga's homage to 
Buddha in the last verse of his Sastra keeps the tradition quite alive. 
Finally a Note on DVipadam vara. Gauda's paying homage to 
DvipJdam vaw in ch. IV, stanza I, has given rise to some controyersy 
amongst scholars regarding the identity of the person so designated. 
Some scholars of Buddhism believe that Gauda refers there to Buddha 
while others 011 the Brahmanical side believe otherwise. It appears 
to us that though Gauda adopts the Buddhistic terminology and pattern 
of arguments to uphold his Advaita philosophy, he cannot be stated to 
have saluted Buddha in the stanza. Our reason for this surmise is that 
Buddha is prominently spoken as "the Superiormost teacher 
of all men and gods" (m~ffi ~ql1~1lTTl1) but not Dvi-
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padam vara, "best of all men". Naga accordingly pays homage to 
Buddha as Vadatam vara, 'best of all speakers or teachers' (v.the first 
stanza of his Sastra.... ct ~ q~ijl ql:I1). Gauda's object , 
of reverence is the best of bipeds, i.c. Purushottama, 'best of all 
persons' which obviously refers'to Good, Visnum, ref Gita: ~ff+r: 
S~«q;:'1: tRqTC'it~a:r~a: eh. XV, 17, 'the Supreme Person is diffe-
rent (from the lower Brahman) and known as the Supreme Self' which 
passage speaks of the Supreme Being penetrating three realms of exis-
tence (loka-traJa). We should not confuse between 'Dvipadam varam' 
and' Vadatam varam' which two terms signify two disrinct theological 
concepts. 
It does not matter very much whether Gauda refers to Buddha 
or Purushottama. None can nevertheless gainsay that Gauda adopted a 
great deal of dialectics from Naga and other Buddhist authors and 
adapted them sUitably to the needs of upholding his Upanishadic Monism 
Advaita darsana. 
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